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MEASURING THEAVERAGE MARGINAL TAXRATE
FROMTHE INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX
Abstract
The economic effects of taxation depend on the configuration of marginal
tax rates. We consider here the appropriate measure of a marginal tax rate
for the federal individual income tax, which has a graduated—rate structure
and allowsfor numerous legal andillegal deductions from total income •Our
conclusion is that the explicit marginal rate fromthe taxschedule is the
right concept for many purposes.Hence, we construct approximately weighted
averagesof these marginal tax rates for 1916—80. When weighted by adjusted
gross income, the arithmetic average of marginal tax rates is 5% in 1920, 2%
in 1930, 6% in 1940, 20% in 1950, 23% in 1960, 24% in 1970, and 30% in 1980.
We also discuss the dispersion of marginal tax rates, as well as the behavior
of average tax rates and deductions from taxable income. One noteworthy result
concerns the fraction of adjusted gross income that accrues to families that






(312) 962—8923In order to assess the economic effects of taxation, we have to know the
applicable marginal tax rates for individuals or businesses. For example,
marginal tax rates on income affect decisions to work, produce, save and in-
vest. However, the readily available data refer to totals of tax collections
in various categories, such as individual income taxes, corporate profits
taxes,andsoon.Fromthesefigures,we can constructmeasures of average
tax rates. But, especially in thecase of the graduated—rate federal indivi-
dual income tax, these measures do not tell us directly the fractionof income
thatthe "representative" person gets to keep at the margin. Therefore, average
tax rates may not provide an adequate basis for determining the allocative
effectsof taxation.
There have been some attempts—notably, Joines (1981) and Seater (1982)—.-
to use more detailed data to compute average marginal tax rates. Basically,,
for the federal individual income tax, they look across classes of adjusted
grossincome from the IRSdatato see how taxespaid per return vary with in-
come perreturn. They then use the ratio of the change in taxes per return
to the change in income per return to calculate marginal taxrates. Generally—
as Joines and Seater argue is appropriate——this concept of a marginal tax rate
issubstantially smaller than the explicit rate from the tax schedule. But,
as we discuss later, thereare problems in interpreting their concept of a
marginal tax rate in terms of the underlying substitution effects on individuals'
choices. In fact,we argue thattheexplicit rate from the schedule is the
rightconcept for many purposes)
In the present paper we focus on the federal individual income tax. This
category is interesting for several reasons. First, it is large——467. of federal—2—
and 30% of totalgovernment revenuesin 1980. Second, the appropriate dis—
aggregated data are available. Third, because of the graduated—rate structure,
the differences between marginal and average tax rates are likely to be im-
portant. However, a full measure of marginal tax rates would incorporate other
levies, some of which are based on property or expenditures, rather than on
income. We do plan to include soon the social security tax,2 which constitutes
26% of federal and 17% of total government revenues in 1980. We may also con-
sider other types of taxes, but even the full array of these would not be
sufficient. That's because a full concept of a marginal tax rate encompasses
also the transfers that people lose when they earn additional income. Thus
far, we have no plans to tackle this issue.
Theoretical Considerations
We set up a simple model to deal with the following question. What is
the appropriate concept of a marginal tax rate in the context of an income
tax that first, has a graduated—rate structure, and second, that allows for
numerous legal and illegaldeductionsin the calculation of taxable income?3
In particular, what is the relation among the following:
• the various substitution effects on people's choices,
• the explicit tax rates from the tax schedule,
• the marginal association between taxes and total income (which is
the Joines—Seater concept of a marginal tax rate), and
• the average tax rates?
Consider a family that receives market income, Y. This income comes partly
from working the amount L at the wage w, and partly from non—labor income, I.
Hence, total market income is—3—
(1) Y1+wL
Taxes depend on taxable income, T —Y—D,whereD is a broad con-
cept of deductions. This concept includes explicit deductions from the tax.
law (which are either a standard deduction or the itemized amounts for other
taxes, interest, etc.), plus personal exemptions, plus unreported income,
plus any excess allowances for business and moving expenses, plus the pre—
ferentia]. treatment of deferred income and (real) capital gains, and so on.
The relation of taxes to taxable income comes from the law, which specifies
the tax function,
(2) T=T(YT)
where we assume that the marginal tax rate from the schedule, T' ,Isnon-
negative and non—decreasing——that is, T' >0andT" >0(a "progressive"
tax). Weassumealsothat T =0for T <
Wesuppose that deductions——in our broad sense——depend first, on the re-
sources, X,thatpeople devote to generating deductions, and second, on the
quantityof afamily's consumptionthat the taxlaw treats favorably. In the
U.S. this category,.which we label as C2, Includes owner—occupied housing,
charity, various activities of state and local governments, etc.
We write the function for deductions in the form,
(3) D f(X) + c&C2
The first part of the function, f(X),satisfiesthe properties, f' >0
f" <0,andf(0) >0.Inother words, moreresources spent on tax—avoidance,
,generatemore deductions, but at a decreasing rate.5 Then, for someone—4—
who expends no effort, the quantity of deductions generated here is the
positive amount, f(0) .Wecan also think of the function, f(X) ,as
incorporating the goods—equivalent of any penalties for tax—cheating, as
well as the probability of being caught. Finally, we note that for some
occupations, such as the self—employed, the ease of concealing income and
taking excessive business expenses implies that deductions, f(X) ,are
large for a small amount of effort.
The second term in equation (3), aC2, describes the effects of favored
consumption. We treat a as a positive fraction, since——except for some
limitations on the amounts of charitable contributions——there do not seem
to be important sources of diminishing effects of favored consumption on
deductions. (Business expenses could be entered explicitly as another source
of deductions inequation(3)—see footnote 7below.)
Forsome of our results, it matters that income——either total or taxable——
not appear in the function that generates deductions, f(X). One way income
mightenter is through the standard deduction, which depends on adjusted gross
income in some years. But, this provision turns out to be quantitatively un-
important for most purposes, because the standard deduction varies with in-
comeonly over a limited range at the low end of incomes. For example, for
1944—63, the standard deduction is 10%ofadjusted gross income,but only
untilthe deduction reaches$1,000. (Currently, the standard deduction does
not depend on income.). In any case, we neglect these features of the standard
deduction in our analysis.
Another possibility is that the IRS's examination effort varies with a
family's adjusted gross income, as well, as with the claimed amounts of deduc-
tions. (It might depend also on occupation and other characteristics.) Then,—5—
depending on the IRS's procedure, someone with more adjusted gross income
would find it either easier or harder to generate a given amount of deductions.
That is, some measure of income would appear in our function, f(X).In
fact, our subsequent analysis can be used to design an optimal pattern of
enforcement by the IRS, which would include a possible dependence of the
IRS's effort on someone's income. Although it would be interesting to ex-
plore this idea, we have not yet done so..
Finally, income might matter because of some limitations oncategories
of itemized deductions. For contributions, more Income means more potential
deductions. However, for medical expenses and now for casualty losses, an
increase in income means that less deductions can be claimed. Also, there
are limitations on the amounts of interest expense that relate to"investment
purposes." Here, an increase in someone's income from capital can increase
these allowable deductions. Miller and Scholes (1978) stress this point.
In any case, our present analysis does not incorporate any direct effects
of income in the function that generates deductions. Lateron, we note the
consequences of inchtdingIncomein this function.
Totalincomegoes either to ordinary consumption, C1 ,favoredconsumption,
c2,taxes,T ,ortaxavoidance, X •Forexpository purposes, we do not
consider any saving. Hence, the family's budget constraint is6
(4) YI.1C1+C2+T+X
Thefamily's utility depends positively on the two types of consumption and
negatively on market work, L •Thatis,
(5) U U(c1, C2, L)-6-
where the partial derivatives are U1, U2>O and U3<O. Families maximize
utility, subject to the budget constraint from equation (4), the definition
of total market income from equation (1), and the determination of taxes from







Equation (6) determines the amount of resources, X, that people put into
tax avoidance. At the margin, the gain from applying an extra unit of
resources is the extra deductions, f', multiplied by the marginal tax rate
from the schedule, T'. Hence, people go to the point where the marginal
gain, f'T', equals the marginal cost, 1. It follows that people with a
higher marginal tax rate, V--which will typically be those with higher total
incomes--go to a lower value of f'. Correspondingly, they spend more
resources, X, on avoidance, and end up with more deductions, D.
Equation (7) says that the utility rate of substitution between ordin-
ary consumption, C1, and "leisure" equals the after-tax wage rate, where the
adjustment for taxes uses the marginal rate from the tax schedule, T'.
Therefore, although people use resources and favored consumption to reduce
their taxes, it is still the explicit marginal tax rate from the schedule
that affects the allocation between ordinary consumption and leisure. That's
because, at the margin, people have the option to work an extra unit, earn
won this amount, retain w(l-T') as additional disposable income (since X
and C2 do not shift at this margin), and spend the funds on cl.8—7.-
On the other hand, when choosing favored consumption, C2, households
consider the marginal effect, a, on deductions. Therefore, in equation (8),
the utility rate of substitution between favored consumption and leisure
equals a different measure of the after-tax wage. The pertinent marginal tax
rate here is T'(l-a)/(l-aT'), which is below T'since O<ct<l. applies. (Viewed
alternatively, the utility rate of substitution between C' andC2 equals
1-aT', because of the preferential tax treatment for C2.)
Average Tax Rates and Deductions
For some purposes, we would like to know how taxes vary cross-sectionally
with total income, Y. We can think of the variations in Y as generated from




Therefore, the marginal relation of taxes to income, dT/dY ,isbelow the explicit
marginal tax rate, T', because of the positive relation between income and
deductions, dD/dY. This last term is positive because first, more income
means more effort spent at tax avoidance--that is, dX/dY>O--and second,
more income means more favored consumption--that is, dC2/dY>O. We also
V'findthat 0 <dD/dY<1and hence, that 0 < dT/dY<T'.(All of these results
follow unambiguously as long as 0 <dC2/dY<1holds.) Finally, we get
the last expression in equation (9) by substituting the condition, f'l/T' ,
fromequation (6).
Consider how the average tax rate, T/Y ,changeswith total income, Y
Since taxes are zero until total income reaches some positive amount (because-8-
some deductions accrue with zero effort), and since the marginal tax rate, T' ,
riseswith taxable income, the average tax rate tends also to increase with
total income. In order for this possibly not to hold throughout, we need a
range of income where the term, dT/dY ,declineswith Y .But,it's clear
from equation (9) that this cannothappenif the marginal relation of deductions
to income, dD/dY ,isa positive constant. Rather, we need a range of strong
positive effects of income on dD/dY ,sothat the ratio of deductions to income,
D/Y,canincrease with income over some interval. But, the diminishing returns
to tax avoidance——that is, f" <0—worksagainst this. If we neglect the role
of favored consumption, C2 ,andlookonly at the..response of the effort for
tax—avoidance, X ,thenwe tend to get a diminishing effect of income ondD/dY.9
Hence, dT/dY——and, moreover, the average taxrate,T/Y——tend to increase with
total income, Y
There seem to be two main possibilities for reversing this result •First,
there may be ranges where set—up costs for tax avoidance are important, so
that the concavity of the f—function does not hold throughout. Then, there may
beregions where D/Y rises with income, so that T/Y maydecline. Second,
theresponseof deductions, dD/dY ,dependsalso on howfavored consumption,
c2, reactsto higher income.Ifthe favored itemsareluxury goods or if the
demand for these goods becomes increasingly responsive (positively) to higher
marginal tax rates, then the term, dD/dY ,mayrise with total income. Then,
the response of taxes, dT/dY ,conceivablywould decline over some range (see
footnote 10, above).
Overall, it is not easy theoretically to generate positive effects of total
income on dD/dY .(Empirically,if we measure Y by adjusted gross income,
then dD/dY appears to be roughly constant as incomevariescross—sectionally——
see below.) Hence, the term, dT/dY—and, moreover, the average tax rate, T/Y——
are likely to rise with total income.—9—
We focus empirically on measuring the marginal tax rate from the tax
schedule, T' .Thisrate governs the substitution between ordinary goods,
C1,andwork.But, as mentioned before, some others—for example, Joines
(1981) and Seater (1982)——attempt to calculate the expression, dT/dY
(Empirically, they measure Y by adjusted gross income, rather than by total
income, which is unobservable.) Therefore, this alternative procedure includes
the response of deductions, dD/dY ,inthe measure of a "marginal tax rate."
Clearly, this expression understates the marginal tax rate, T' ,whichapplies
to the substitution between ordinary goods and work. But, we may also be in-
terested in the lower marginal tax rate, T'(l —cz)/(l—aT'),whichapplies
to the margin between favored goods, C2 ,andwork. Under a very special con-
dition, the Joines—Seater construct, dT/dY ,approximatesan appropriate weighted
average of the two marginal tax rates, V and T'(l —a)/(l—ciT').Basically,
this happens if the effort for tax avoidance is unimportant—in the sense that
dX/dY0——and if favored consumption is roughly unit elastic in total income.il
(Even here we can get into trouble when we use adjusted gross income as a proxy
for total income.) Generally, we cannot directly use a measure of dT/dY to
represent the underlying substitution effects from taxation.
Our results, which focus on the rate from the tax schedule, V ,provide
estimates for one of the interesting marginal tax ratesin the theory. But, at
present,we have not figured out how to measure the other marginal tax rate,
T'(l —a)/(1—aT').Fundamentally,this is because we lack observable measures
for avoidance effort, X ,favoredconsumption, C2 ,andtotal income, Y
Conceivably, we will be able to go further here by constructing some useful
proxies. For example, itemized deductions give some information about favored
consumption. Also, the expenditures on accountants may tell us something about
the effort for tax avoidance, X—10--
Weightizg
Suppose that we know each family's marginal income—tax rate, T ,at
a particular date. We want to construct an aggregateindex——or average mar-
ginal tax rate——T, which can be used to understand some aggregatebe-
havior. As is usual, we cannot construct a single index that works satis-
factorily in all contexts. But, there are some interesting special cases,
which suggest that it might be valuable to construct some indices.
Assume first that the logarithm of each family's total consumption
demand, C ,dependslinearly on the marginal tax rate, T ——that is,12
(10) log(C) =aj
—bT
(We can think alternatively of the supply of goods, Y ,asdepending on
.)Now,if everyone's slope coefficient, b ,onT in equation (10) is
the same, then we can readily construct a useful measure of average marginal
tax rates. This average is a linear combination of the T with weights equal
to Ct/C ,whereC is aggregate consumption——that is,
(11) ?' —E(c/C)T' ji i.
Here, the relation of aggregate consumption to the constructed average marginal
tax rate will reveal the coon slope coefficient. Specifically, the propor—
tional response of C to V approximates the underlying coefficient, b .(The
result turns Out to be approximate because our measures for changes in V pick
up some effects from shifts in weights.) Empirically, we useshares of adjusted
gross income to proxy- for the weights by shares of consumption.
Alternatively, we might have that each family's consumption exhibits a con-
stant elasticity of response to the fraction of income that they keep at the—11--
margin, (1 —T)
.Thisamounts to postulating a constant elasticity with
respect to the after—tax wage. Then, the form for consumption is
(12) log(C) =÷B.].og(i. —T)
Now, if the elasticity, B ,isthe same for all, then the appropriate index




If we construct the average marginal tax rate from equation (13), then the
elasticity of aggregate consumption, C ,tothe term, (1 —T'),approxi-
mates the co=on elasticity, B .Here,the index amounts to a geometric
weighted average of the (1 —T)
.Theaverages computed from equation (13)
exceed those found from equation (11). (Because log(l —T)is a convex
function of .)But,empirically, these two types of indices for average
marginal tax rates do not differ greatly.
For some purposes——for example, when measuring employmentorunemployment—
we count numbers of persons, rather than amounts of consumption or income.
Then, in the formulas from equations (11) or (13), we can think of the weight,
Ct/C ,asreflecting the 1th family's share of total workers or persons, rather
than of consumption or income. Hence, we would be more interested in person—
weighted average marginal tax rates, rather than in income—weighted numbers.
Operationally, we can construct indices of average marginaltax rateswhere the
individual rates are weighted by numbers of returns, rather than by adjusted
gross income. The indices weighted by numbers of returns are typically much
lower than those weighted by adjusted gross income.-12—
An overviewofthe Data
-
Ourestimates for' marginal tax rates refer to the federal individual in-
come tax, asreported for each year for 1916—80 in the InternalRevenue Service's
Statisticsof Income. Unfortunately, the data are not reported in an entirely
consistent manner over time. (This reflects either progress or shifting tastes.)
Therefore, we combine the sources as follows:
1961—77, 1979—80: There are tables classified by the highest marginal
tax rates that apply to each return. (For 1980, the tables areinStatistics
of Income Bulletin, December 1982.) These tables show the numbers of returns
and the adjusted gross and taxable income that apply in each class. From
these tables we can compute average marginal tax rates, using either shares
of adjusted gross income or shares of numbers of returns as weights. However,
we have to make some approximations in order to take account of the maximum tax
rate on earned income (60% in 1971, 50% for 1972—80). Basically, for those
who pay the maximum tax, we treat their marginal tax rate as 50% (60% in 1971)
for all types ofincome.However, the overall impact of the adjustment for
the maximum taxisnot too large—for example, In 1979 onlyabout 4%of the
aggregate of adjusted gross income applies to returns that use the 50% maximum
rateon earned income.'3
1954—60: There are tables classified by ranges of taxable income per
return and by filing status (married/filing jointly, single, etc.). Using the
tax schedule foz each filing status, we can computethe associated marginal tax
rate.14However, these tables do not provide information about adjusted gross
income. So, we calculate here only the average marginal tax rates when weighted
by numbers of returns.
-1916—43: The tables are classified by net income, which is roughly
taxable income plus exemptions for self, spouse and other dependents. The
tax—rate schedules do not depend on marital status for these years. Within
each class of net income, we make the approximation that everyone has the
same taxable income——that is, we neglect variations in the ratio of exemp-
tions to net income. For the purposes of calculating average marginal tax
rates, this approximation is probably satisfactory. (The true dispersion in
examptions would not be too large and the marginal tax rates would be roughly
linear, within each class, in taxable income.) Then, we can calculate mar-
ginal tax rates for each class of net income. We also have the data to weight
these figures by numbers of returns and by total income, which corresponds
roughly to adjusted gross income plus business expenses of individuals. This
weighting by total income approximates that by adjusted gross incomeforthe
15
later years.
1944—78: We have tables classified by ranges of adjusted gross income
per return and by filing status. The tables indicate for each class the amounts
of taxable income and tax liabilities. We can compute marginal tax rates if
we assume that each taxpayer in a given class has the same taxable income.
More generally, our averages will be okay if the dispersion of marginal tax
rates within a class is roughly linear in taxable income. In any event, we
use these computations only to fill in the missing years from the other tables.
These are 1944—60 and 1978 for the indices weighted by adjusted gross income,
and 1944—53 and 1978 for those weighted by numbers of returns. We fill in the
missing data based on the relation of the different series over the overlapping
years. The high correlation during the overlap suggests that this procedure is
satisfactory.—14—
Non—Filers and Unreported Income
The IRS data that we use refer to filed returns and to amounts included
in adjusted gross income. But, conceptually, our theory aflows for gaps between
a family's total income and the reported amount of adjusted gross income. Some of these
differences are legal, such as the exclusion from adjusted gross income of
non—taxable transfer payments, fringe benefits, some contributions to pension
plans, and parts of the income from interest or capital gains. Other exclu-
sions are illegal, reflecting especially the unreported income from the under-
ground economy. However, the various exclusions from adjusted gross income
do not disturb the conclusion that the explicit marginal tax rate from the
schedule is the substitution variable that we wish to measure for each family.
If we could, we would change the weighting pattern from shares of adjusted
gross income to shares of a broader concept of income. But, if each family
filed an income—tax return, we would not want to make an overall adjustment
to account for the gap between the aggregates of adjusted gross and total income.
On the other hand, the data pick up only filed returns. Hence, we would
like to include the non—filers as families (and incomes) that face a zero mar-
ginal. tax rate. Therefore, we need estimates for each year of the numbers of
families(and their incomes) who do not file tax returns.
Over the period from 1950 to 1980, the ratio of numbers of returnsfiled
tothe Census Bureau's estimate for the total number of households changes
verylittle.16 Specifically, the ratio is 1.22 in 1950 and1.18 in 1980,with
a range from 1.14 to1.24for the intervening years.(The ratio can exceedone
becausesome households file. more than one return, and because the census's
definition of a household does not coincide with the IRS's concept of a filing
unit.)Therefore,we assume as an approximation that the fraction of families—15—
that do not file a return does riot change since l95O,, (Subsequently, we also
make this assumptionfor 1946—49.) However, since wedo not knowthevalue
ofthis fraction, we makeno adjustment duringthis period to account for
non—filers. This procedure will be satisfactory if nearly all families file
a tax return, as is suggested by the high ratio of filed returns to numbers
of households. But, to the extent that we miss some non—filers, our tax rates
will be too high by roughly a constant proportion.
Accordingto some recent research, the size of the underground economy in-
creased dramaticallyduring the 1970s.See O'Neill (1982) for a discussion
and criticism of this work. Given this background, it is noteworthy that the
ratio of numbers of returns to numbers of households changes little in recent
years. If there had been a major increase in the importance of the underground
economy, then we would have expected to see a decline in this ratio. However,
the ratio would be sensitive only to variations in the numbers of families
whose full—time market activities are in the underground sector. Most people
who participate only on apart—time basis would presumably file a taxreturn.
For the years before 1947, we have reliable data on nubers of households only at
census dates. Also, the definition of a household varies over time. But, we
do know theadult population (persons aged 18 andover) for each year. Further,
the data that we have before 1950 suggest that the adult populationproxies
sad.sorily through the late 1940s for the number of households. In particular,
the ratio of adult' population to the number of households is 2.74 in1920, 2.68
in 1930, 2.63 in 1940, and 2.58in1947. This slow rate of decrease in the
ratio of adults to householdswould not affect our calculations appreciably.
Table 1shows the ratio for each year of the number of tax returns filed
to the adult population (aged 18 and above). Notice that this ratio rises
sharply during World War II, which reflects a large decrease in the level of—16—
income at which returns must be filed. But, the ratio is reasonably stable
since the war, varying between .50 and .58. In fact, most of the tendency
for the ratio to rise since the late 1940s can be explained by the decrease
in the ratio of adult population to the number of households7
The ratio of filed returns to adult population is only .05 in 1917, but
then rises because of the tax—law changes during World War I to reach .11 in
1920. After falling to about .05 between 1925 and 1935, the ratio rises to .09
in 1939. Then, the major increases in coverage during World War II raise the
ratio dramatically to .51 in 1945 and .53 in 1946. Subsequently, there are no
sharp changes in the ratio.
Forthe period,1916—45, we calculate the gap between the actual ratio for
eachyear andthemean ratio, .54,which applies from 1946 to 1980. Then, we
assumethat this gap corresponds to the number of families that do not file
returns. That is, we estimate the total number of potential taxreturnsfor
each year from 1916 to 1945 by multiplying the value for population aged 18
andoverby .54. Then, we use these numbers when we compute the weights in the
formulafor average marginal tax rates (when weighted by numbers of returns).
Equivalently, we include the estimated number of non—filers (the number of
potentialreturns less the actual number) as families with zero marginal tax
rates.Forthe years from 1946to 1980, we makeno adjustments for non—filers.
Thatis, we assume that the potential nwii'ber. of returns equalsthe actual number.
In orderto computethe indices when weighted by income, we used an esti-
mate for each year of the income——corresponding to the concept of adjusted
gross income as reported to the IRS—that accrues to non—filers. We derive this
estimate from the ratio of aggregate adjusted gross income to aggregate personal
income, which appears in Table 1. Notice again that this ratio does not change
greatly.from 1946 to 1980. The range of variation is from .75 to .81, with no—17—
TABLE 1
RATIOS: NUERS OF RETU1NS 'O ADULT POPULATION AND ADJUSTED GROSS
INCOME TO PERSONAL INCOME









> 18 Income > 18 Income
1916 .007 .21 1950 .51 .79
7 .054 .24 1 .52 .80
8 .069 .28 2 .53 .80
9 .082 .33 3 .54 .80
1920 .109 .36 4 .52 .79
1 .098 .41 1955 .53 .80
2 .098 .41 6 .53 .81
3 .109 .42 7 .53 .80
4 .102 .42 8 .52 .78
1925 .057 .33 9 .52 .80
6 .055 .32 1960 .52 .79
7 .054 .34 1 .52 .79
8 .054 .37 2 .52 .79
9 .053 .36 3 53 .79
1930 .048 .31 4 .53 .80
1 .042 .28 1965 .54 .80
2. .050 .30 6.55 .80
3.047 .30 7 .55 .80
4 .050 .29 8 .56 .81
1935 .054 .29 9 .57 .80
6 .063 .32 1970 .55 .8
7 .072 .2 1 .54 .78
8 .070 .32 2 .55 .79
9 .085 .36 3 .57 .78
1940 .160 .52 4 .57 .78
1 .28 .67 1975 .55 .75
2 .39 .70 6 .56 .76
3 .46 .71 7 .56 .76
4 .48 .71. 8 .58 .76
1945 .51 .71 9 .58 .75




Source:Numbers of returns and adjusted gross income are from Statistics of
Income, Individual_Income TaxReturnsfor each year. Population aged
18 and over is from Historical_Statistics of the U.S., Colonial Times
to_1970,p0, and Statistical Abstract, various yearsPersonal
Income is from TheNational Income and PriictAccounts of the U.S.,
1929—76, andEconomicReportofthe President,_1982. Values for
1916—28 are estimated from nominal GNP, baaEhe ratio of personal
income to GNPfor1929.cleartrend.Hence, we again make no adjustments for this period.
Before 1946, we calculate the gap for each year between theratio of ad-
justed gross to personal income and the mean value, .79,which applies from
1946 to 1980. Then, we assume that this gap corresponds to the income——equivalent
to adjusted gross income——for those families that do notfile returns. That is,
we estimate the total of adjusted gross incomefor each year by multiplying
aggregate personal income by .79. Then, we usethis figure when we compute the
weights in the formula for average marginal tax rates (when weighted byamounts
of adjusted gross income).
Results for Average Marginal Tax Rates
Table 2 shows our time series of average marginal tax rates for 1916—80.
We present four sets of figures, depending on whether the weights are by ad-
justed gross income or numbers of returns, and on whether thearithmetic or
geometric averaging applies. Notice that the last considerationmakes only a
small difference. However, the average marginal tax rates are much lower—by
as much as 10 percentage points in recent years——if the weightingis by numbers
of returns, rather than by income. The series that appear in Table 2 involve
some piecing together of different types of underlying data, asmentioned before.
We provide the details in the appendix.
Fpr most purposes, the time series weighted by income, ratherthan by numbers
of returns, will be more interesting. Then, since it makes little quantitative
difference and because the arithmetic procedure corresponds to usual index formu—
las, we focus our discussion now on the series shown in the first columnof Table 2.
This series weights by adjusted gross income and uses the arithmetic form of average.
The top graph in Figure 1 shows these values of average marginal tax rates for
1916—80. The highlights are as follows.—19—
TABLE 2









Year Arithmetic Geometric Arithmetic Geometric
196 .012 .013 .0002 .0002
7 .037 .044 .002 .002
8 .054 .069 .007 .007
9 .052 .066 .006 .006
1920 .046 .056 .008 .008
1 .042 .051 .005 .005
2 .046 .055 .005 .005
3 .033 .037 .004 .004
4 .035 .040 .003 .003
1925 .030 .032 .002 .002
6 .028 .031 .002 .002
7 .032 .035 .002 .002
8 .041 .044 .002 .002
9 .035 .038 .001 .001
1930 .023 .025 .001 .001
1 .017 .018 .001 .001
2 .029 .035 .002 .002
3 .031 .037 .002 .002
4 .034 .040 .003 .004
1935 .038 .044 .004 .004
6 .052 .065 .005 .006
7 .046 .057 .006 .006
8 .034 .042 .004 .004
9 .038 .046 .004 .005
1940 .056 .070 .008 .009
1 .113 .132 .038 .040
2 .192 .221 .107 .113
3 .209 .248 .184 .192
4 .252 .278 .194 .201
1945 .257 .285 .194 .201
6 .226 .250 .145 .151
7 .226 .247 .153 .158
8 .180 .193 .121 .125
9 .175 .187 .119 .123TABLE 2continued




































































































































































1980 .304 .318 .200 .210
Note: We discuss in the text the procedure for weighting by adjusted gross income
or by numbers of returns. The arithmetic indices have the form of equation
(11), while the geometric ones correspond to equatIon (13).
We use the tables from Statistics of Income, Individual Income Tax Returns
for each year, as discussed in the text. The appendix details the proce-
dure for obtaining the figures in the middle periods (1944—60, 1978, when
weighted by adjusted gross income, and 1944—53, 1978, when weighted by
numbers of returns).—21—
From a value of about 1% in 1916, the average marginal tax rate rises along
with major increases in the tax—rate schedule to a peak of 5% during World War I.
Then, because of a series of rate reductions through 1929 and the declines in
income for 1930—31, the marginal, rate falls to a low point of less than 2% in
1931. Subsequently, the rate rises sharply to reach 5% by 1936. Apparently, the
tax—rate increases between 1932 and 1936 reflect the Hoover—Roosevelt program for
fighting the Depression! In particular, for 1931, the marginal tax rates in the
schedule start at i½%, then rise to a top re of 25% for taxable incomes above $100,000.
But, in 1936, the rate starts at 4%, reaches 62% for taxable incomes above $100,000,
and hits a top rate of 79% for taxable incomes above $5 million.
From a value below 6% in 1940, the average marginal tax rate climbs to a
peak of 26% during World War II. These changes reflect three main elements:
first, reductions in the levels of income at which taxes are positive, second,
increases in the regular tax rates from the schedule, and third, special levies
fowar. Following World War II, the average marginal tax rate declines toa
low point of 18% in 1948—49.
After a peak of 25% during the Korean War, theaverage marginal tax rate
moves from 22% in 1954 to 25% in 1963. Then, the famousKennedy—Johnson tax
cuts reduce the rate to 21% in 1965. Subsequently, thegrowth in nominal in-
comes and the Vietnam surcharge raise the rate to 25—26% for1968—69. Then,
following the removal of the surcharge, the effects of bracketcreep increase
the rate steadily from 24% in 1971 to 31% in 1978. For1979, the rate falls
to 29%, apparently because of a widening in the taxbrackets, although there
are no changes in the lowest and highest tax rates.But, for 1980 the average
marginal tax rate rises to 307..
The first column of Table 3 and the lowercurve in Figure 1 show a simple
measure of an average tax rate. This rate is the ratio of total federalindividual
income taxes to the aggregate of personal income. Becauseof the graduated—rate—22—
structure of the tax law and the excess of personal over taxable income, we
anticipate that this type of average tax rate would be below our measureof the
average marginal tax rate. Also, while many changes in the tax lawand in
incomes would generate correlated movements in the two measures of tax rates,
there are others——such as changes in deductibles versus changes in statutory
tax rates—that would produce substantial divergences.
Empirically, the average tax rate is 30 to 40% of our average marginal
rate 7% for 1916—79, 41% for 1946—79, and 39% for 1970—79). But, the bulk
of the movements in the two series are parallel. For 1916—79, the correlations
between the two are .99 in levels, but only .73 in first differences. For
1946—79, the comparable figures are .87 and .89. Some notable differences
between the series show up in recent years. For example, the average tax rates
for 1974 and 1977 are nearly the same, but the average marginal rate for 1977
is about 2½ percentage points higher. Then, the average tax rate hardly
changes from 1978 to 1979, but the average marginal rate falls by about 2 per-
centage points. Overall, for 1970—79, the correlation of the average marginal
tax rate with the average tax rate is .81 in levels, but only .39 iiifirst
Table 3 shows also the average marginal tax rates that Joines (1981, Table 9)
calculatesfor 1929—75. (We use his series that applies to the federal income
tax on labor income.) As noted earlier, Joines attempts to measure the marginal
relation of taxes to income, dTfdY .Hecarries this out by seeing how the
taxpaid per return changes with the adjusted gross income per return as we move
from one class of adjusted grossincome tothe next) Thus, he incorporates
boththe effects of the marginal tax rate from the schedule, T',andthe posi-
tive association of deductions per return with income per return. (Here, de—
ductions refer to the difference between adjusted gross and taxable income. The
gap between adjusted gross and total income is not considered, because of lack
of data.)—23—
Not surprisingly, Joines's values are below our measures of average mar-
ginal tax rates. For example, for 1970—75, his figures average 86% of ours,
while for 1946—75 the percentage is 81%. The correlations of Joines's values
with ours for 1946—75 are .91 in levels and .88 in first differences. (Before
1946, the adjustment for non—filers means that our series and Joines's are not
directly comparable.)
Suppose now that we compare our average marginal tax rates (column 1 of
Table 2) with the average tax rates and Joines's values, which appear in Table 3.
Clearly, in terms of the levels of the numbers, it makes a great deal of differ-
ence which series one uses. However, because of the correlation among the series,
the choice may be less important for the purpose of time—series regression analysis.
But, there are substantial differences in the behavior of all three series over
time. Until we empoy these series for other purposes——for example, in explain-
ing the behavior of aggregate output and employment——we cannot be sure how im-
portant these differences are:
The Dispersion of Marginal Tax Rates
We look now at the cross—sectional dispersion of marginal tax rates for
the recent period, 1961—77, 1979—80. For these years, we have the tables that
classify directly by the highest marginal tax rates. Figures 2—6 show the cumu—
lative density functions for the marginal tax rates for some selected years, 1961,
1965, 1970, 1975, and 1979. In each case the upper curve applies to numbers of
returns, while the lower one refers to amounts of adjusted gross income. For
example, for 1979, Figure 6 indicates that 65% of the returns and 33% of the











1916 .004 1 .095 .186
7 .016 2 .102 .190
8 .018 3 .102 .188
9 .018 4 .092 .171
1920 .014 1955 .095 .176
1 .013 6 .098 .177
2 .014 7 .098 .188
3 .010 8 .095 .182
4 .010 9 .100 .190
1925 .010 -- 1960 .098 .195
6 .009 -- 1 .101 .194
7 .0:11 -- 2 .101 .196
8 .015 -— 3 .103 .198
9 .012 .023 4 .095 .178
1930 .006 .018 1965 .092 .182
1 .004 .013 6 .095 .186
2 .007. .020 7 .100 .189
3 .008 .028 8 .111 .210
4 .010 .031 9 .115 .218
1935 .011 .033 1970 .101 .205
6 .018 .047 1 .096 .186
7 .015 .052 2 .098 .204
8 .011 .046 3 .102 .219
9 .012 .046 4 .106 .234
1940 . .018 .082 1975 .098 .237
1 .040 .110 6 .102 --
2 .072 .174 7 .104 --
3 .113 .194 8 .109 --
4 .099 .203 9 .110 --





Iote: The average taxrateequals the ratio of total individual income taxes
(after credits) to the aggregate of personal income. The data on taxes
are from Statistics of Income, Individual Income Tax Returnsfor each
year. For personal income, see the notes to Table 1.The values for








year mean stnd. dev.% 35% mean stnd. dev.% 35%
1961 .240 .119 .093 .174 .095 .012
2 .244 .116 .092 .177 .094 .013
3 .247 .116 .096 .179 .095 .014
4 .221 .105 .077 .156 .088 .010
1965 .212 .101 .083 .148 .083 .011
6 .217 .101 .086 .153 .083 .012
7 .223 .103 .095 .157 .084 .014
8 .252 .119 .119 .173 .093 .018
9 .261 .118 .148 .181 .096 .031
1970 .243 .112 .117 .168 .097 .022
1 .239 .110 .118 .164 .093 .020
2 .242 .111 .128 .164 .097 .023
3 .250 .110 .143 .170 .099 .028
4 .257 .112 .158
•
.176 .101 .034
1975 .263 .113 .175 .178 .105 .041
6 .273 .114 .202 .185 .108 .052
7 .281 .120 .234
•.187 .115 .066
8 .310 -- -- .208 -- --
9 .289 .127 .258 .190 .119 .075
•
1980 .304 .129 .312 .200 .125 .101
Note: The values for the meanscorrespondto those in Table 2. Z35%is
the fraction of adjusted gross income or numbers of returns for which
the marginal tax rate exceeds 35%. The data come from Statistics of
Income, Individual TaxReturnsfor each year, using the tables that
classify by marginal tax rates.-26—
Table4 shows for the period, 1961—77, 1979—80, the standard deviations of
the marginal tax rates about their arithmetic means, when weighted either by
adjusted gross income or by numbers of returns. When weighted by numbers of
returns, the standard deviation rises from .084 in 1967 to .125 in 1980.
ilowever, when weighted by adjusted gross income, this pattern shows up only
since 1973, where the increase is from .110 to .129.
We get a more interesting picture of dispersion when we look at the
fraction of incomes or returns for which the marginal tax rates are "high"——
that is, if we look at the weight in the upper tail of the cumulative densities
that appear in Figures 2—6. This exercise is interesting because some types of
tax—avoiding activities—such as exotic tax shelters and the heavy use of
currency for transactions—may become worthwhile only at very high marginal tax
rates. Then, in order to study these types of phenomena, we would be more in-
terested in the weight in the upper tail of the marginal tax rate distribution,
rather than in the mean or standard deviation, se.
Picking 35% arbitrarily as a high marginal tax rate, we see from Table 4
that therehave been dramatic increases inthefraction of adjusted gross income
or ofnumbers of returns for which the marginal tax rate exceeds this number.
Specifically, the fraction of adjusted gross incomes for which the marginal
tax rate exceeds 35% falls from 9% in 1961 to 8% in 1964 (because of the Kennedy—
Johnson tax cuts), but then rises to 12% in 1970, 18% in 1975, and 31% in 1980.
In other words, the fraction of income that faces a marginal tax rate of at least
35% quadruples from 1964 to 1980! With respect to numbers of returns, the
fraction falls from 1.2% in 196]. to 1.0% in 1964, but then increases to 2.2% in
1970, 4.1% in 1975 and 10.1% in 1980. Hence, the fraction of returns that faces
these high marginal tax rates rises by a factor of ten from 1964 to 1980.—27—
Bob Hall suggests (in private conversation) that the rapid rise in $100
bills in recent years may relate to the sharp increase in the fraction of income
that faces high marginal tax rates. (Others have suggested the growth in
criminal activity as a cause.) In particular, the fraction of the value of
all currency that is in denominations of $100 or greater is highly stable—
varying only between 20% and 22%——from 1944 to l97O. But, the fraction then
increases sharply to reach 36% for July 1980 and 39% for July 1982.
The Behavior of Deductions
Figures 7—10 show the cross—sectional relation of deductions per return to
adjusted gross income per return (for all filing statuses) for the years, 1961,
1965, 1970 and 1975. Here, deductions, which refer to the differences between
adjusted gross and taxable incone, include exemptions, but exclude the various
subtractions from total income that precede the calculation of adjusted gross
income. The figures consider the range of adjusted gross income per return up
to $70,000.
The data do not suggest much tendency for the slope, dD/dY,tochange
with income, once adjusted gross income exceeds a fairly low amount, whichis
$5,000——$1O,000 between 1961 and 1975.21 In fact, this appearance of a roughly
linear relation between deductions and adjusted gross income holds up if we add
the upper tail of income.(At the low end, the slope decreases with adjusted
gross income.) For the years shown in the figures, which range from 1961 to
1975, and for values of adjusted gross income that exceed $10,000, the estimated
slopes, dD/dY ,arein the interval between .16 and .18. That is, once ad-
justed gross income is greater than $5,000——$1O,000, deductions per return are
roughlyapositive intercept plus 16—18%ofadjusted gross income per return.
(Ofcourse, we cannot say how adjusted gross income per return relates to total.—28—
income per return—presumably, most of the serious taxavoidanceprecedes the
calculationof adjusted gross income.)
Recallthatthe marginal relation of taxes to income is
dT/dY —T'(].—dD/dY)
Therefore, if dD/dY is roughly constant——as appears to be true if we measure
Y by adjusted gross income—then dT/dY is approximately a constant fraction
of the marginal tax rate, T' .Inparticular, if dD/dY lies between .16 and
.18, then dT/dY is 82—84% of V .Infact, for the post—World War II period,
this relation accounts for most of the difference in average levels between
Joines's estimates of dT/dY (see Table 3) and our figures on average marginal
tax rates. For 1970—75, his values average 86Z of ours, while for 1946—75, they
are 81% of ours.
Concluding Remarks
Our time series on average marginal tax rates should be useful for a variety
of research purposes. But, our own plans——and our initial motivation for con-
structing the series——focus on two areas. First, we plan to use the data on
average marginal tax rates in a study of the effects of government policies
on aggregate output, employment, and so on. Some previous work on this topic
stresses the influences of monetary disturbances and of various types of govern-
ment purchases. (See, for example, Barro, 1981) Now, we can add a measure of
the average marginal tax rate to assess this aspect of fiscal policy. Conceiva-
bly, we may also be able to distinguish temporary changes in marginal tax rates
from permanent ones. Then, the temporary changes involve intertemporal—substitution
effects, which do not arise for the permanent changes.Hence, we can test for a—29—
differentimpact of temporary versus permanent shifts in marginal tax
rates on output, employment, and other macroeconomic variables.
Second, a theory of public—debt creation, outlined in Barro (1979), in-
cludes the intertemporal behavior of tax rates. Specifically, this theory
suggests that debt management smoothstax rates over time, in spite of
fluctuations in government spending and aggregate real income. In order to
test this theory fully, we need the time—series data on average marginal tax
rates.
Finally, as mentioned before, the present series on average marginal tax
rate8 is incomplete because it refers only to the federal individual income tax.
We plan some extensions, at least to incorporate the social security tax and
some other levies. At this point, we are uncertain abouthowfar we can goin
constructing acomprehensive measure of the average marginal tax rate.—30—
Footnotes
1Protopapadakis (1982) also uses the Joines—Seater approach to calculate
average marginal tax rates for capital—gain income. Earlier, Wright(1969)
uses the explicit rates from the tax schedule to calculate average marginal
tax rates for interest and dividends over the period, 1913—58. Exceptfor
his weighting by amounts of interest and dividend income, Wright's approach
seems to accord with the one that we emphasize in this paper.
2Theimportant considerations are first, distinguishing the self—employed
from employees; second, allowing for the tax—deductibility of employer contribu-
tions; and third, ascertaining the fraction of persons (and their incomes)whose
earnings exceed the ceiling amount. Joines (1981, p. 199) estimates the last
element from the distribution of labor income per return from the IRS data.
But, this procedure is unsatisfactory, at least for families with more than one
income earner. However, the appropriate data are available directly from the
-SocialSecurity Administration. A more difficult issue concerns the extra bene-
fits that people get when they "contribute" more to social security. The marginal
benefit shouid be subtracted from the payments to compute a net marginal tax
rate. But, these calculations—which depend on anticipated benefit schedules—
may be difficult.
3Fora sketch of a related model, see Heckman (1983).
4Since1975,theearned—income credit makesT' <0(and T <0)forthe
federal individual income tax over some range of incomes. We neglectthis element.
Someother credits can effectively be combined with deductions in our subsequent
formulation.—31—
5The function,f(X) ,wouldnot be concave throughout if there were
set—up costs associated with producing deductions. At the low end of incomes,
there is non—concavity because of the standard deduction, which is an effort—
free alternative to itemized deductions.
6We do not allow for changes in the relative prices of C1, C2 or X
Essentially, we think of the various goods as perfect substitutes on the supply
side.
an alternative, we could write total income as the output of the pro-
ductionfunction, YF(L ,B),whereB is "business expenses," which could
include the costs of moving. These business expees then appear also in the
function that generates deductions •Inthis formulation the marginal product of
labor replaces the wage, w ,inequations (7) and(8).We also get the optimiza—
tioncondition for business expenses, (aF/aB)(l —T')1 —T'•(aD/aB),where
3D/aBis the marginal effect of business expenses on deductions. If aD/SB —1
thenaF/3B1 applies.
8Eere, the results change if income has a direct effect on deductions (for
reasons that we mentioned before). If this marginal effect on deductions is
positive (negative), then the effectiye marginal tax rate is below (above) T'
9Neglecting terms that involve third derivatives and ignoring changes in




Theterms involving third derivatives reinforce this result if T"' <0and
f" <0.Thedata suggest that T"0is satisfactory over a substantial
rangeof income, with T" <0applying in the upper tail. If E'+0and
+0as X thenwemust have a range where f" > 0 applies.
1iotethat dT/dYT'(l —dD/dY).Hence,it follows that(d/dY)(dT/dY)
—T'(d/dY)(dD/dY) + T"(l —dDIdY)2.Therefore,since T" >0,weknow that
(d/dY)(dT/dY) >0 if (d/dY)(dD/dY)<0
UThedesired weighted combination of marginal tax rates is presumably
+ C2) + [T'(l —ct)/(l—csT')].[C2/(C1+ C2)] .Theexpression,
dT/dY ,equalsthis if dX/dY =0and dC2/dY =[C2/(C1+ C2)] ((1 —T')/(l—
12Recallthat we have abstracted from saving——hence, the effect of
in equation tl0) reflects only the substitution between market goods and leisure.
Possibly, individuals perceive their current marginal tax rates as permanent, so
that the main intertemporal—substitution effects do not arise.
13Recall that we neglect the earned—income credit, which applies since 1975
for taxpayers who have a dependent child. For 1981, the credit rises by lOZ of
earned income up to a total earned income of $5,000. Hence, the marginal tax
rate is —1OZ over this range. (People with negative taxes receive money from the
government.) Then, the credit is constant until earned income equals $6,000, but—33—
falls by 123% of earned income up to a total of $10,000. In this range some-
one'smarginal tax rate is12½Z plus the explicit rate from the taxschedule.
(For incomes above $10,000, the credit stays at zero.) The amount of earned—
income credit depends also (negatively) on the quantity of unearned income.
14We also make an adjustment for alternative—tax computations.
15We have interesting problems for 1942 and 1943, which involve.' the
introduction of tax withholding with the legislation of January 1943. In
order to avoid the payment of two years' worth of taxes in 1943, the govern-
ment forgave roughly 75% of the tax liability for the year——either 1942 or 1943—
forwhich anindividual.s computed liability was smaller. Thus sxeue'seffecttva
marginaltax rate for either 1942 or 1943 was only about 25% of the explicit
rate.For most people, this would be 1942. However, althoughthepossibility
of tax forgiveness was discussed before January 1943, we cannot say how much
this provision was foreseen when people earned their incomes in 1942. In any
event, our calculations for 1942 and 1943 use the explicit tax—rate schedules,
which disregard the effects of tax forgiveness.
'6'The data on numbersofhouseholds are from Historical Statistics of
the U.S., Colonial Times to 1970, PP. 41—43; and Statistical Abstract,
various issues.
ratio falls from 2.58 in 1947 to 2.41 in 1950 (with some changes
in the concept of a household), to 2.21 in 1960, 2.15 in 1970, and 2.06 in
1980.—34—
18Notethat personal income includes only a small amount of unreported
income, which comes from estimates by the IRS. (For a discussion, see
O'Neill (1982, pp. 2, ff.).) Therefore, we cannot use the ratio of adjusted.
gross to personal income in order to infer the behavior of unreported income.
19Joines's values also weight by the estimated fraction of total labor
incomein each income class,rather than by adjusted gross income.
20
This behavior Is surprising, given the large increase in prices and
real incomes. For some reason, the average denomination of currency outstand-
ing(total dollar value divided by total numberof bills) does not change much
overthis period. The sources for our data on currency denominations are the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,' Bankit,g andMonetary Statistics,
p.415; Bankingand MonetaryStatistics, 1941—1970, pp. 622, ff.; Annual
ticalDigest, 1970—1979,p. 552; andU.S.Department of the Treasury, Monthly
Statementof U.S. Currency and Coin, Form 1028, various issues.
211f we look only atitemizeddeductions (excluding standard deductions
and exemptions), then the slope increases at the low end of incomes. But,
the relation between itemized deductions per return and adjusted gross in-
come per return is again roughly linear for values of adjusted gross income
that exceed $5,000—$l0,000.—35—
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Note: The average marginal tax rate is the arithmetic index, weighted by























































The Cumulative Distribution of Marginal Tax Rates in 1961
Note for Figures 2—6: The vertical axis shows the cumulative density, corres-
ponding to each marginal tax rate. The data are from
Statistics of Income, Individual Income Tax Returns,
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The Cumulative Distribution of Marginal Tax Rates in 19JQ.
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TheCumulativeDistribution of Marnal Tax Rates in 1979
based on numbers
of returns










Deductions per Return vs. Adjusted Gross Incomper Return in 1961
Note for Figures 7—10: The data are from Statistics of Income, Individual Income
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Deductions per Return vs. Adlusted Gross Income per Returnin 1975
—45.--Al-
Appendix
Table Al shows estimates of average marginal tax rates for 1944—78,
based on the tables that classify by ranges of adjusted gross income per
return. We indicated in the text our procedure for estimating the marginal
tax ratewithin each class. Then, we weight either by adjusted gross in-
come or be numbers of returns anduseeither the arithmetic or geometric
formula to generate the figures shown in the table.
We use the values in Table Al to fill in our missing data as follows.
For the cases where we weight by adjusted gross income, we get the arithmetic
values for 1944—60 from the equation, —.021 +l.093•(valuefrom Table Al).
The coefficients come from a regression of the values shown in Table 2 on
those shown in Table Al over the period, 1961—70. For the geometric form,
we use the equation, —.020 + l.07l (value from Table Al). En both cases the
a2valuesfor the regressions are nearly .99. For 1978, we get the arithmetic
-valuefrom the equation —.019 +L.l12.(valuefrom Table A].). These coeffi-.
dents come from a regression over the period, 1971—77. Similarly, for the
geometric value, we use the equation, —.005 +l.045.(valuefrom Table Al).
En these cases the values of R2 are .98.
We use an analogous procedure for the cases where we weight by numbers of
returns. Here, we get the missing data for 1944-53 by using regression equations
that are estimated over the period, 1954—70. For the arithmetic case, the
equation is —.004 +l.034•(valuefrom Table Al). For the geometric case, the
equation is —.004 ÷1.037.(value from Table Al). In these cases the R2 values
exceed .99. We get the missing data for 1978 from regressions that are esti-
mated over the period, 1971—77. For the arithmetic case, the equation Is-A2-
TABLEA].






1944 .250 .278 .191 .198
1945 .254 .285 .191 .197
6 .226 .252 .144 .150
7 .226 .249 .151 .157
8 .184 .198 .121 .125
9 .180 .193 .118 .122
1950 .198 .216 .130 .135
1 .231 .252 .163 .168
2 .249 .269 .179 .185
3 .247 .265 .181 .187
4 .222 .239 .158 .163
1955 .228 .246 .162 .167
6 .231 .249 .166 .171
7 .232 .249 .167 .173
8 .229 .245 .164 .170
9 .236 .253 .169 .174
1960 .234 .250 .169 .175
1 .239 .257 .171 .176
2 .240 .257 .174 .179
3 .243 .260 .176 .181
4 .222 .234 .154' .159
1965 .214 .225 .147 .151
6 .219 .230 .152 .156
7 .226 .238 .156 .160
8 .251 .266 .171 .176
9 .261 .276 .180 .186
1970 .240 .252 .166 .172
1
' .231 .242 .161 .166
2 .235 .246 .160 .166
3 .243 .254 .166 .172
4 .252 .264 .173 .179
1975 .253 .265 .167 .175
6 .263 .276 .176 .184
7 .269 .283 .175
'
.183
8 .295 .310 .193 .203
Note: The data are from Statistics of Income, Individual Income Tax Returns
for each year, using th tables that classify by adjusted gross income
per return. See the notes to Table 2 in the text.-A3-
—.054 + l.361.(value from Table Al). For the geometric case, the equation
is —.050 +l.323(valuefrom Table Al). Here, the R2 values are .88 and
.93, respectively.